

Financial Viability of PEG Access
Television in Vermont
–Brief Overview for House Ways and
Means, 4/22/21



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The PEG Study

- “PEG” means Public, Educational and Governmental programming.
- Study aimed to provide options to “ensure the future financial stability and viability of PEG channels.”
- Report examined:
 - Likely financial future
 - Possible efficiencies and other forms of organization.
 - Possible new financing mechanisms.

Topics Not Covered in Today's Slides

- Cable history and PEG history
- Multiple roles of PEG organizations
- Viewership
- Efficiency options
- Changes to business model options

Vermont PEG Funding

- Funding Sources
 - 92% from cable companies.
 - Remaining 8% comes from fees, memberships, donations, and other sources.
- Expenditures total about \$8 million. Size of PEG budgets variable.
 - Highest single PEG budget is about \$800 K.
 - Lowest single PEG budget is about \$75 K.

Federal Regulation of Cable

- Cable Act of 1984.
 - Also called Communications Act of 1934, “Title VI.”
 - Allocates responsibility between federal government and “franchising authorities.”
 - State has very limited authority over cable rates.
- Title VI sets limits on “franchise fees” imposed.
 - 5% of cable revenues for operations is the maximum.
 - Vermont assigns 100% of this revenue to PEG.
 - “Capital” expenses are excluded from the 5% maximum.
 - In some states, an additional 1% contribution for capital is normal.
 - General taxes are not “franchise fees.”

State Regulation

- PUC Rule 8.000 (1991)
 - PEG organizations are certified by their cable companies, not the state.
 - Cable companies must:
 - Provide channels for AMO programs.
 - Pay for AMO operating expenses
 - Currently a uniform 5% of gross operating cable revenue.
 - Pay “capital expense” payments and enough equipment for AMO to operate.
 - Actual payment rates vary from zero to 1.25%. Modal rate is 0.5% of gross cable revenue. Capital rates are negotiated between each AMO and cable company pair.
 - AMOs file detailed annual reports with information about their finances and operations.

Telecom and PEG Evolution Since 1984

1. Digital media and the Internet

- Video streaming reduces cable subscription rate and thus reduces PEG revenue.
- PEGs switch to digital technology and Internet streaming.
 - Increases customer convenience.
 - Expands service area footprint.

2. Telecommunications Competition

- Every platform can provide every service.
- Old “silos” (and single industry taxes) look increasingly dated and unfair.

PEG Revenue History and Forecast

- Recent Revenue to AMOs generally stable over the last 5 years.
 - One sizeable dip in 2018-19 because of a nationwide accounting change that affected the “cable revenues” of cable companies.
- Revenue Forecast
 - Low-normal estimate for 2026 shows total PEG payments declining to \$7.04 MM, a loss of about \$0.8 MM.
 - If AMOs also have a 1% inflation in costs, then 2026 deficit could be \$1.4 MM, or 17% of current spending level.
- Risks not quantified:
 - FCC restricting state fees and charges imposed on cable companies.
 - Increasing cable company losses of video subscribers.
 - Cable company strategic decisions to shift from cable service to streaming video.

Financing Constraint #1 – The Cable Act

- “Franchise fee” limited to 5% of cable revenues.
 - Excludes PEG capital costs.
 - Excludes general taxes, like Sales and Use Tax
- FCC’s “Third Order” expands the class of “**in-kind**” services the value of which are to be considered “franchise fees” and which can therefore reduce the level of cash payments to AMOs.
 - Includes any mandated cable service and mandated Internet service.
 - Vermont PUC requires both of these from cable companies in franchise documents (CPGs).
- Third Order still on appeal.
 - Recent oral argument looked bad for FCC.

Financing Constraint #2 – Universal Service

- Vermont’s USF is funded by surcharge on “intrastate” and “interstate” telephone revenues.
 - An unusual base, but it has been unchallenged now for 26 years.
- Telecommunications Act of 1996 authorized federal and state USF programs, but with many limitations for states.
 - A state rule cannot be *inconsistent* with the Commission's *rules*.
 - Contributions must be “*equitable and nondiscriminatory*.”
 - Support mechanisms must be “*specific, predictable, and sufficient*.”
 - Mechanisms cannot rely on or “*burden*” federal universal service support mechanisms.
- Post-1996 litigation has not clarified these concepts. There is substantial risk in doing anything innovative in the universal service sphere.
 - The FCC appears strongly opposed to letting states fund universal service by a surcharge on Internet access.

Financing Constraint #3 – Barriers to Entry

- States cannot do anything that prohibits entry into telecommunications markets. 47 U.S.C. § 253.
 - This could potentially include a confiscatory charge or tax.
- “Safe harbor” exemption for management of rights-of-way.
 - Courts might not sustain a ROW tax as unrelated to state’s cost of maintaining the ROW.
- Case decisions
 - Have invalidated franchising requirements, but generally for provisions that give too much discretion to the franchising agent.
 - One court sustained a city charge of 4% of gross revenues against a telecommunications company seeking to install miles of underground conduit.
- FCC has issued decisions suggesting they will preempt many ROW charges.

Financing Constraint #4 – Internet Tax Freedom Act

- States cannot tax Internet access.
 - Now a permanent provision of federal law.
- Exceptions for:
 - Universal service (but must meet FCC standards)
 - 911 and E-911

Financing Constraint #5 – FCC Broadband Policy

- FCC issued *Restoring Internet Freedom Order* in 2017.
 - Reversed once again FCC’s position on whether Internet access is a “telecommunications service.” It’s not.
 - Order purported to preempt states from regulating Internet access.
 - Announced federal “preemptive policy of non-regulation.”
 - Order preempted States taxing Internet access for universal service.
- On appeal, the FCC was reversed (in part).
 - When the FCC declared Internet access is not a “telecommunications service,” it undercut its own authority.
 - FCC authority over the industry and the states is limited.
 - But, FCC’s universal service discretion not substantially affected.

Revenue Option #1 – New 1% Charge on Cable Revenues

- Proceeds would go to the state General Fund, and be appropriated to AMOs.
 - AMOs would have to use the money for capital expenditures.
- Would displace existing cable company payments for capital costs of AMOs.
 - State might have to delay effective dates until existing contracts expire.
Net effect an increase in cable company charges of about \$0.4 MM.
- Advantages:
 - Similar to charges in some other states.
- Disadvantages:
 - Not competitively neutral – increases burden on cable companies.
 - Involves state treasury in a new kind of transaction with little marginal financial change effected for PEGs.

Option #2 – New Streaming Video Charge

- A new charge on streaming video, paid to General Fund and appropriated to AMOs.
 - Sales tax already applies to this service.
 - Charge could also apply to satellite video services.
- Advantages
 - Vermont Sales and Use Tax already covers this. This helps solve many administrative and scope issues.
 - This kind of charge has been upheld at least once against a Commerce Clause challenge. Other states considering enacting such charges.
 - Could improve the alignment between the Vermont residents who benefit from PEG service in the modern age – through Internet streaming – with those who pay for that service.
- Disadvantages
 - Cost of administering a new tax

Option #3 – Raise the VUSF Rate

- VUSF already supports a range of telecommunications services.
 - VUSF is for telephone and broadband.
 - PEG is for video.
- Most of the VUSF funding now goes for E-911, but the VUSF isn't currently raising enough to match E-911 appropriations.
 - VUSF rate may have to increase anyway.
- Disadvantages:
 - VUSF is funded by telephone surcharges. It may not be fair to telephone customers to add this additional burden.
 - Federal limitations on universal service prevents broadening the base of the VUSF to include Internet access payments.

Option #4 – Pole Attachment Charge

- Vermont telecommunications providers use utility poles.
 - Rocky soil, lots of ledge. Buried cable is expensive in Vermont.
 - Includes cell companies that use cables to reach their antennas.
- Revenue estimate: \$4.4 MM/yr. (= \$10/att./year x 440 K att.)
- Advantages:
 - More competitively neutral than charges on cable companies or on telephone companies.
- Disadvantages:
 - A new tax. Attachers already pay pole attachment fees, about \$15/yr/att.
 - Increased costs for all telecoms, including CUDs.
 - Give credit against PEG payments to comply with 5% franchise fee limit.
 - Possible “federal-aid” highway restrictions.

Option #5 – Multipart Option

1. Create Vermont Telecommunications Public Benefit Fund (TPBF).
 - Funded by a pole attachment charge. Estimated rate is \$10 per year per attachment.
 - Must allow cable companies to reduce PEG payments dollar for dollar.
 - Legislature appropriate TPBF to PEGs to replace lost cable operating revenues.
2. Repurpose the VUSF as an E-911 fund.
 - Broaden the base - add Internet access revenue. Will reduce burden on customers of traditional non-Internet telephone services..
 - Transfer other, non-E-911, VUSF program costs from the TPBF.
3. New capital fee of 1% on cable company gross revenue from cable revenue of cable companies, for PEG.
 - Legislature appropriate TPBF to AMOs to replace lost cable capital payments.
4. Repeal the Telephone Personal Property Tax.
 - Hold the General Fund harmless by a transfer from the TPBF.

Financial Effects – Example @ \$10/yr/att.

Program Element	Policy Change	TPBF	PEG	General Fund
		(millions)	(millions)	(millions)
1	New Pole Attachment Charge	\$ 4.41		
	Offsetting Reduction in Cable Company Operating Payments to PEGs		\$ (1.32)	
	Appropriation to PEGs	\$ (1.32)	\$ 1.32	
2	Miscellaneous Programs (Lifeline, TRS) Shifted to TPBF	\$ (0.57)		
3	New PEG Capital Fee	\$ 1.20		
	Eliminate PEG Capital Payments		\$ (0.86)	
	Appropriation to PEGs	\$ (1.20)	\$ 1.20	
4	Repeal Telephone Personal Property Tax			\$ (2.40)
	Fund Transfer from TPBF to Gen.Fund	\$ (2.40)		\$ 2.40
Total		\$ 0.12	\$ 0.34	\$ -

Recommendations

- Encourage AMO's to continue their efforts to improve cost efficiencies and seek additional sources of funds.
- Option (#5) deserves serious consideration.
 - Modernizes the state's telecommunications tax structure.
 - Broadens the base of AMO payments in a way that reflects the increasing use of the Internet as a medium for video programming, including PEG video.
 - Encourages AMOs to expand their program benefits into surrounding towns that have broadband but lack cable television service.

Questions?

Interlude – Connection Charges

- Replacing gross receipts funding with per-connection funding has been popular in some states.
 - Maine and some other states use a per-line connection charge on telephone numbers to fund its state universal service fund.
- A connection fee on Internet access could distribute the burden of VUSF funding more fairly, but that step is blocked by the FCC.
- A per-connection fee on telephone customers, replacing the VUSF gross revenues fee, could be a slight improvement over the status quo, but is beyond the scope of this PEG study.

Interlude – Telephone Personal Property Tax

- TPPT provides no revenue to PEG programs.
- Current rate is 2.37 % of the “net book value” of a telephone company.
- “Net book value” is a regulatory concept, designed to allow a rate regulated company to make a fair recovery on its initial investment.
 - It was clearly defined and easy to administer in the 1960s.
- Net book has complex features:
 - Exclusion of a large amount of “non-regulated” property used for Internet service, any video services.
 - Accumulated depreciation greatly reduces book value on an older network.

Telephone Personal Property Tax

- Disadvantages as a PEG resource.
 - Not competitively neutral. Many competitors do not pay.
 - Revenue declining.

